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1. Introduction 
In many countries, it has been observed that the supply of labor seems to depend on business cycle 
fluctuations. That is, it is commonly believed that supply of labor is higher when the labor market is 
tight in contrast to the situation when the labor market is slack. One popular explanation for this is that 
during a recession workers become discouraged and give up searching for work. Economists view this 
as the result of workers believing that their chances of finding a job are so low that the implied 
monetary and psychological costs of searching yield a utility of searching that is lower than the utility 
of being out of the labor force (as perceived by the worker). A second source of business cycle 
variations in labor supply is variations in individual wage rates. Although the discouraged worker 
concept1 has been around for a long time (Ehrenberg and Smith, 1988), there are surprisingly few 
empirical micro-based studies that address this issue within a structural framework.  
 The purpose of this paper is to analyze married women's decisions on labor force 
participation and employment in a way that explicitly accommodates the discouraged worker effect 
within a structural setting. Our point of departure is a simple search model that is used as a theoretical 
rationale to motivate the structure of the utility of looking for work. From this theoretical 
characterization, an empirical random utility model is developed and represented by the probabilities 
of not participating in the labor force, working or being unemployed. Our approach enables us to 
characterize these probabilities in terms of market wage rates, demographic factors, non-labor income 
(affecting the utility of not working), and the probability that a worker receives a job offer given that 
she searches for work. As a special case of our search-theoretic setup persons searching will accept the 
first job offer that arrives. This “decision rule” corresponds to the pronounced official policy of the 
regional government unemployment agencies in Norway. In these agencies, an employment 
“manager” decides to a large extent (at least in principle) which jobs are suitable for which type of 
worker and subsequently allocates vacant jobs to the unemployed workers she thinks are suitable. For 
other workers who organize their own search this schedule is too simplistic. 
 Micro studies that analyze the effect of unemployment on labor supply are Ham (1986), 
Blundell, Ham, and Meghir (1987, 1998), and Başlevent and Onaran (2003). There are however, some 
studies based on macro time series; see for example, Benati (2001), Darby, Hart, and Vecchi (2001), 
Otero et al. (1992), and Tachibanaki and Sakurai (1991). The paper that is closest in spirit to our work 
is Blundell, Ham and Meghir (1998) because they make use of explicit structural restrictions in their 
model, similarly to our approach. However, whereas they analyze labor force participation, 
                                                     
1 According to Benati (2001), the discouraged worker concept was introduced by Long (1953, 1958). 
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employment, and hours of work, in this paper, we analyze only employment and labor force 
participation. Our analysis other aspects our analysis differs from theirs in other aspects as we impose  
weaker restrictions on our model and use a data set that covers 15 years, whereas their data set covers 
only four years. We also propose a particular version of Heckman's two-stage method for correcting 
for selectivity bias in the wage equation (cf. Heckman, 1979). Except for Dagsvik et al. (1988) and 
Dagsvik and Strøm (1994), this method does not seem to have been applied by others. 
 The empirical model is estimated on a sample of independent cross sections of married 
women in Norway, for each year from 1988 to 2002. The estimated model can be applied to predict 
the discouraged worker effect, given the wage rate, non-labor income and other explanatory variables. 
As regards the discouraged effect, we find that, on average, about 13.5 percent of the married women 
outside the labor force are discouraged. 
 The paper is organized as follows. In the next section the theoretical framework is 
developed and the general structure of the choice model is obtained. In Section 3, the empirical 
version of the model is specified and the estimation procedure is discussed. Section 4 contains a 
description of the data and we present the estimation results in Section 5. Section 6 reports the results, 
including selected elasticities for different populations groups as well as for the whole sample.  
2. The model 
In this section we develop a simple framework that subsequently will enable us to formulate an 
empirical model for individuals’ assignment to states; “Out of the labor force” (state 0), 
“Unemployed” (state 1), and “Employed” (state 2). Let Uj denote the utility of being in state j, 
0,2j = . If the agent is out of the labor force she is viewed as being uncertain about her opportunities 
in the labor market and about the utility of arriving job offers. Job offers arrive according to a Poisson 
process with arrival intensity λ (possibly individual specific), which is assumed to be known by the 
individual. The corresponding search cost per unit of time is denoted c. Let V denote the utility of 
searching and assume that the agent is boundedly rational in the sense that she ignores discounting and 
is unable to account for the possibility of lay off. Then, applying the standard Bellman type of 
argument, cf. Lippman and McCall (1981), or Burdett et al. (1984), 
(2.1) ( )( ) ( )( )21 max , ( )V t V c t t E U V c t o tλ λ= − ∆ − ∆ + ∆ − ∆ + ∆ . 
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Equation (2.1) says that (in a stationary environment) the utility of searching for work is evaluated as 
follows.2 When searching two things can happen in a small time interval of length ∆t. With probability 
1 tλ− ∆ no job arrives within ( ),t t t+ ∆  so that the expected utility in this case remains equal to V 
minus search cost c∆t. Otherwise, a job offer arrives with probability λ∆t, in which case expected 
utility equals ( )2max ,E V U c t− ∆ . After rearranging, dividing by ∆t and letting ∆t tend towards zero, 
we obtain: 
(2.2) ( )2max , cV E V U λ= − .  
The expression in (2.2) is quite intuitive. First, recall that by assumption, a job offer arrives according 
to a Poisson process, which means that the interarrival times of job offers are independent and 
exponentially distributed with parameter λ. From this distribution, it follows that the expected interval 
between two job arrivals in this model is equal to 1/λ. Consequently, c/λ is the expected search cost 
(or disutility) until a job arrives. Thus, V is equal to the expectation of the maximum of the utility of 
working and the utility of searching minus the expected cost of searching until a job arrives. 
Moreover, the exponential distribution has the lack of memory property. This means that, given some 
time after the last job arrival, the remaining time to the next arrival is independent of the time elapsed 
since the last arrival. 
 For the sake of empirical analysis, we shall modify the relation (2.2). Note that we can 
write: 
(2.3)  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )( ) ( ) ( )
2 2 2 2 2
2 2 2 2
max ,
1 .
E V U VP U V E U U V P U V
V P U V E U U V P U V
= < + > >
= − > + > >
 
When inserting (2.3) into (2.2) it follows that we can rewrite (2.2) as: 
(2.4) ( ) ( )2 2 2
cV E U U V
P U Vλ= > − > . 
Equation (2.4) states that the utility of searching is equal to the expected value of working, given an 
acceptable job, minus the expected cost until an acceptable job arrives. When ( )2 1P U V> = , (2.4) 
reduces to 
                                                     
2 Recall that o(∆t) is a small term in the sense that o(∆t)/∆t approaches zero when ∆t tends towards zero.   
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(2.5) 2
cV EU λ= − . 
This special case corresponds to a setting in which the agent will accept the first offer that arrives. As 
mentioned in the Introduction, this corresponds to the actual policy at public unemployment agencies, 
where the employment manager selects jobs considered as “suitable” for each unemployed worker. 
Normally, the unemployed worker cannot refuse a job offer viewed as suitable by the manager if she 
wishes to continue to receive unemployment benefits.  
 Let  
 ( )* 2 0P U V V Uλ λ= > > ,    ( )2 2 2 2E U U V v ε> = + , 
and 0 0 0U v ε= + , where v0 and v2 are systematic terms that depend on observed individual 
characteristics whereas ε0 and ε2 are random error terms that are supposed to account for the effect of 
unobservables. From (2.4) and the assumptions above, it now follows that the individual will decide to 
search for work (participate in the labor market) if: 
(2.6) 2 0 0 2* ,
cv v ε ελ− − > −  
where ( )0 2ε ε σ−  has cdf G(x), where G is assumed to be known and σ is a positive scale parameter, 
such that σ2 is proportional to the variance of 0 2ε ε− . Hence, the probability of searching equals: 
(2.7) ( )0 2 0 *cP V U G v v σλ
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞
> = − −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠ . 
As c is positive, this model implies a positive relationship between the probability of being in the labor 
force and the arrival rate *λ  of acceptable jobs. In the concrete econometric specification to be 
discussed in the next section, v2 will depend on the wage rate whereas v0 depends on demographic 
variables and non-labor income.3 Let q be the probability that the individual has a job offer and that 
this job offer is acceptable, given that the individual is unemployed (searching for work). Then, the 
probability that the individual is working, 2P , equals 
(2.8) ( )2 0 2 0 *cP P V U q qG v v σλ
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞
= > = − −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠ . 
                                                     
3 In a standard life cycle setting, v0 will depend on some measure of permanent or lifetime income (through the marginal 
utility of wealth). 
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Similarly, the probability of being unemployed, 1P , equals 
(2.9) ( )( ) ( )1 0 2 0 *1 1 cP P V U q q G v v σλ
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞
= > − = − − −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠ . 
Consequently, it follows that the unemployment rate satisfies: 
(2.10) 11 ,Pq
P
− =  
where 1 2P P P= +  is the probability of labor force participation. The formulae in (2.8) and (2.9) are 
true only if the arrival and value of the job offers are independent of the error term in the utility of 
working. Before we turn to the issue of empirically specifying the model, we need to establish the link 
between the arrival rate of acceptable jobs, *λ , and the probability that an acceptable job is available, 
q. To this end, note first that the functional dependence between *λ  and q is such that *λ = ∞  
corresponds to q = 1 and *λ = 0 corresponds to q = 0. As a first-order Taylor approximation we can 
therefore write: 
(2.11) k
q
)11(1* −=λ
, 
where k is a positive constant. Thus, in the empirical specification below, we shall substitute *λ  by the 
expression given in (2.11). 
3. Empirical specification 
3.1.  Specification of the state probabilities 
We shall now discuss the empirical specification and estimation of the model above. From (2.6) and 
(2.7), we note that when the structural terms v0 and v2 are linear in parameters the parameter σ  cannot 
be identified and it can therefore with no loss of generality be normalized to one, provided that σ  is 
independent of time. We start with the specification of the expected utility of working, given that the 
job is acceptable. It is assumed that the individuals know with perfect certainty the wage rate they will 
get in the market, but that they may be uncertain with respect to other attributes of the job. We assume 
that the utility 
 ( )2 2 2≡ >% i t i t i t itU E U U V  
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has the structure 
(3.1) 2 2log ,i t it i tU Wθ ε ∗= +%  
where Wit is the real wage rate of individual i in period t and 2
∗
i tε  is a random error term that is 
possibly correlated with the individual’s wage rate. (We shall see in a moment that this specification is 
consistent with the assumption made above that 2 2 2U v ε= +% .) Furthermore, assume that: 
(3.2) 0log it t it itW Xβ β η= + + , 
where Xit is a vector that includes length of schooling, experience and experience squared. Note that 
we allow the intercept in the wage equation to depend on time.4  
 From (3.1) and (3.2), it follows that: 
(3.3) ( )2 0 2 2 2i t t it i t i t i tU X vθ β β ε ε= + + = +% , 
where 2 2i t i t itε ε θη∗= + and 2 0( )= +i t t itv Xθ β β . Note that, if itη and 2i tε ∗  are correlated this represents 
no problem. What is important, however, is that 2i tε is not correlated with Xit. As regards the 
systematic part of the utility of not working we assume that 0 = −i t itv Z γ , where Zit is a vector of 
variables consisting of one, age, age squared, the logarithm of non-labor income, and the number of 
children in the household. Finally, assume that the probability of getting a job given that the woman 
searches, is given by: 
(3.4) ( )
1
1 expit it
q
B δ= + , 
where Bit  is a vector consisting of the number of children, length of schooling, experience, experience 
squared, and time dummies. The variable "non-labor income" is not included in Bit, which ensures 
identification of the model. The specification in (3.4) represents a reduced form version. This is 
sufficient for the purpose of this paper, where the role of the specification in (3.4) is as an instrument 
variable that enables us to identify the model empirically.5 From the assumptions and analysis above, 
we find that the probability of person i being unemployed or employed can be expressed as: 
                                                     
4 We have experimented with an alternative specification with a constant intercept and aggregate unemployment rate, or 
alternatively, q, as an additional regressor. The regressors are supposed to represent the effect of the business cycle. 
However, as this specification produced unreasonable results (wrong signs), it was abandoned. The main reason for these 
unreasonable effects may be that the timespan covered by the data was too short. 
5 Note that in the most general case, q may depend on preferences. Therefore, one could argue that the B-vector should 
contain the same variables as in the wage equation and the utility of not working. If so, this implies that identification is 
sensitive to the functional form of q. 
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(3.5) ( )( ) ( ) ( ){ }1 0
exp
exp
1 exp
= + + −
+
it
i t t it it it
it
B
P G X Z c B
B
δ θ β β γ δδ , 
and 
(3.6) ( ) ( ) ( ){ }2 0
1 exp
1 exp
= + + −
+i t t it it itit
P G X Z c B
B
θ β β γ δδ , 
respectively, where the constant k is absorbed in the parameter c.  
 We shall next discuss the distributional properties of the error terms ε0 and ε2 and the 
structure of the wage equation of the chosen job. To this end we need the following lemma. 
 
 Lemma 1 
 Assume that , 0,2j j jU v jε= + = , where ε0  and ε2 are random variables with joint cdf  
(3.7) ( ) ( )( )0 2/ /0 0 2 2, , 0,2 exp x xjP x x v j e e µµ µε ε − −≤ ≤ = = − + , 
and ( )2 0 21 ,= − corrµ ε ε , (0,1]µ ∈ . Then:  
(3.8) ( ) ( )( )2 0 0 2
1
1 exp
P U U
v v µ
> =
+ −
, 
and: 
(3.9) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )0 22 2 0 0 2 2max , exp 1 − −⎛ ⎞≤ > = ≤ + = − +⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠v v xP x U U P U U x v e e
µµε . 
 
 The first part of Lemma 1, (3.8), is well known; see for example McFadden (1984). The 
second part, (3.9), can be found in Strauss (1979) or alternatively in Dubin (1985). For the readers' 
convenience, the proof is given in Appendix C. 
 In the empirical application below, we assume that the error terms ( )0 2,i t i tε ε  are bivariate 
extreme value distributed with cdf as in (3.7). Then, it follows from (3.8) that the cdf G is a logistic 
distribution: 
(3.10) ( )
1( )
1 exp
G x
x µ
=
+ −
. 
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From (3.8) in Lemma 1, we note that the logit model is consistent with utility maximization where the 
error terms are bivariate extreme value distributed, regardless of the degree of correlation between the 
error terms. 
3.2. Correction for selectivity bias 
We shall now discuss a particular version of Heckman's two-stage method, similarly to Heckman 
(1979). To this end, we need to calculate ( )2it i tE η ε (given that the individual works). We assume that: 
(3.11) ( )2 0.5772 ∗= − +it i t itη ρ ε η , 
where ∗itη  is a zero mean random variable that is independent of 2i tε and 0i tε , and ρ  is an unknown 
parameter. The reason why we have subtracted 0.5772 (Euler’s constant) from the error term is 
because 2 0.5772i tEε = . If all three random variables that enter (3.11) were jointly normally 
distributed a representation like (3.11) would always be true. However, in our case one of the 
variables, 2i tε , is not normally distributed so therefore (3.11) represents an approximation to the true 
relation. Before we proceed further, we need the following result. Consider the joint distribution of the 
error term 2i tε and the event that individual i is working. We have: 
 ( ) ( )2 2 0 2 2 0 1, individual works , , 1⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞< = < > = < > + −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
%
i t i t it i t it i t i t i t it
it
P x i P x V U q P x U U c q
q
ε ε ε . 
From this relation, it follows that: 
(3.12) ( )2 2 2 0 1individual works 1⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞< = < > + −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
%
i t i t i t i t
it
P x i P x U U c
q
ε ε . 
From Lemma 1 it follows that: 
(3.13) 
( )( )0 2
2 2 0 2 0 2
1 11 max , 1
exp 1 .+ − − −
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞
< > + − = + − < +⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
⎛ ⎞
= − +⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
% %
i t it i t
i t i t i t i t i t i t
it it
v c q c v x
P x U U c P U U c x v
q q
e e
µµ
ε
 
Recall that the expectation of the type III extreme value distribution ( )exp b xe −−  equals 0.5772b + . 
Consequently, it follows from (3.13) that: 
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(3.14) 
( )( )( )
2 2 0
0 2
1 1
log 1 exp 0.5772 log 5.772,
i t i t i t
it
i t i t it it
E U U c
q
v v c q c P
ε
µ µ µ
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞
> + −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
= + − + − + = − +
%
 
where we recall that Pit is the probability of being in the labor force. As a result of (3.14) and 
assumption (3.11), we obtain: 
(3.15) ( )individual works logit itE i Pη ρµ= − . 
From (3.15) we realize that, similarly to Heckman’s two-stage regression method (cf. Heckman, 
1979), one can correct for selectivity bias by including an estimate of log itP  as an additional regressor 
in the wage equation.  
 Consider finally the conditional variance of itη given that the individual i works. Note that 
it follows from (3.14) that the variance of the conditional distribution of 2i tε , given that individual i 
works, is equal to the unconditional variance (which is equal to π2/6). Moreover, since ∗itη  is 
independent of the error terms of the decision rule that governs the labor force participation entrance, 
we obtain that: 
(3.16)   ( ) ( ) ( )2 *2
2 *
2
Var individual works Var individual works Var individual works
Var Var Var .
it i t it
i t it it
i i iη ρ ε η
ρ ε η η
= +
= + =
 
Hence, we have demonstrated that the variance of the error term in the wage equation is not affected 
by selection. 
 The method for controlling for selectivity described above has been applied previously by 
Dagsvik et al. (1988) and Dagsvik and Strøm (1994). From (3.8) and (3.15), we note that one can set 
1µ = , because this represents no restriction on the empirical model. 
4. Data  
The data are obtained by merging the Labor Force Survey 1988–2002, and three different register data 
sets— the Tax Register for personal tax payers 1988–1992, the Tax Return Register 1993–2002, and 
the National Education database—with additional information about incomes, family composition, 
children, and education.6  
                                                     
6 This is possible owing to a system with unique personal identification numbers for every Norwegian citizen. 
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 The Labor Force Survey collected by Statistics Norway is a representative sample of the 
Norwegian population. It allows a classification of the population into categories based on whether 
they are employed, unemployed or persons not in the labor force. These definitions are in accordance 
with recommendations given by the International Labor Organization (ILO). The classification is 
based on answers to a broad range of questions. Here, we note only that persons are asked about their 
attachment to the labor market during a particular week and that, for a person to be defined as 
unemployed, she must not be employed in the survey week, she must have been seeking work actively 
during the preceding four weeks, and she must wish to return to work within the next two weeks.  
 Information about actual and formal working times in a worker's main as well as second 
job, and background variables such as demographic characteristics, family members and occupation 
are also included in the Labor Force Survey. Conditional on labor market participation, respondents 
are asked whether they consider themselves as self-employed or as an employee. Based on this 
information, we have excluded self-employed persons from the empirical analysis. Working time is 
measured as formal hours of work on an annual basis in both the main as well as in a possible second 
job. If this information is missing and the respondent is participating in the labor market, information 
about actual working time is used. The actual sample we use is a subset of the Labor Force Survey and 
consists of independent cross sections for all the years from 1988 (second quarter) to 2002 (fourth 
quarter), where each person is observed in one quarter in one year only. The observation period (a 
quarter) for a given person is drawn randomly from the periods the person is present in the Labor 
Force Survey. Unfortunately, the Tax Register for personal taxpayers (which is an income register 
with selected income variables) does not include very detailed information about different types of 
incomes. Salaries corresponding to actual labor incomes as well as a stipulated measure of labor 
incomes for self-employed persons are observed, but for other types of income as capital income, the 
information is based on a net income concept with practically no limitations on deductions of interest 
expenditures (as long as net income is nonnegative). As interest deductions vary systematically with 
age, and we want consistency in our definition of non-labor income over time, (net) capital incomes 
are ignored in our measure of non-labor income. Thus, non-labor income include the salaries of the 
husband as well as stipulated labor incomes for selfemployed husband. Nominal hourly wages are 
measured as labor incomes divided by (formal) annual working time, defined above. The nominal 
hourly wage and non-labor income variables are converted to constant prices by using the official 
Norwegian consumer price index with 1998 as the base year. The number of children includes all 
children aged less than 19 years. It would be preferable to have a more detailed classification of 
children by age, but the data do not contain sufficient information about the age of the children. 
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Education is measured in years of schooling, and experience is defined as age minus length of 
schooling minus seven.     
 The sample is further reduced by including only married or cohabiting females aged 25 
and 60 years.7 The motivation for the age restriction is that education is an important activity for 
women under 25 years of age, and for those older than 60 years, early retirement is rather frequent. 
Single women are excluded because the model specifications exclude the possibility that they can stay 
outside the labor market when they have no permanent income. In line with this reasoning, women 
with zero non-labor income are also excluded from the sample. Moreover, females with non-labor 
income higher than one million NOK are also excluded, as are females earning particularly low or 
high hourly wage rates. This leaves us with a final sample for all years of 46,969 used in the 
estimation of the model. The average annual proportion of women outside the labor force is 13.1 
percent, the average unemployment rate is 2.1 percent, and the average participation rate is 84.7 
percent. Table A1 in Appendix A gives detailed summary statistics of the sample with respect to labor 
market states. Two characteristics are evident: There has been a trend increase in female labor market 
participation over the period and the unemployment share shows some business cycle fluctuations 
over the years covered in the sample. In Table A2 in Appendix A, we report the number of 
observations in each year and summary statistics on an annual basis for the variables used in our 
econometric analysis. In Table 1 below, we report, as an example, the segment of Table A2 
corresponding to 1995. 
 
Table 1. Summary statistics of selected variables, 1995 
Variable Mean Std. dev. Minimum Maximum No. of obs. 
Wage rate NOK 117.72 42.22 39.72 455.85 3,231 
Non-labor income NOK 197,740 93,309 149.72 644,538 4,042 
Age 40.92 9.17 25 60 4,042 
Education 11.9 2.58 6 20 4,042 
Number of children 1.3 1.12 0 8 4,042 
 
                                                     
7 To simplify the verbal exposition, we refer to both these types of females as married in the rest of the paper. 
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5. Estimation and empirical results 
5.1. A multistage estimation procedure  
For simplicity we have estimated the model in five stages. The procedure is as follows: In the first 
stage we estimate a reduced form probability of getting a job given search, by the maximum likelihood 
method based on (3.4). In the second stage, we estimate the wage equation (3.2) by OLS. In the third 
stage, we estimate the probabilities (3.5) and (3.6) by maximum likelihood, conditional on the 
estimated q from stage one and the estimated wage equation from stage two. That is, the predicted 
wage is inserted into the structural model as an explanatory variable. Based on the results from the 
third stage, an estimate of log itP  is computed and used as an additional regressor in the wage equation 
in the fourth stage to correct for potential selectivity bias. In the fifth and last stage, we reestimate the 
probabilities given by (3.5) and (3.6) conditional on the estimate of q from stage one and the predicted 
wage obtained in stage four. Results for the two final estimation stages are reported on the right hand 
side of Table 2 and in the middle column of Table 3, whereas the results from estimation stages 2 and 
3 are given on the left hand side of Table 2 and in the first column of Table 3, respectively. In Table 
B1 in Appendix B, we report the estimates of the parameters of q from stage 1; cf. (3.4). Having 
obtained estimates of the parameters of q, one can predict the probability of getting work for each 
individual, also including those who are outside the work force.  
 From Table 2, we observe that the sample selection variable has a negative effect and is 
significant, and we observe that the timespecific intercepts are affected by selection, whereas the 
coefficients associated with schooling and the experience variables change little when selection and 
estimation uncertainty are accounted for. All the estimates in Table 3 related to the maintained model 
have the a priori expected sign and are significant. 
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Table 2. Estimates of the parameters in the wage equation in stages 2 and 4            
Stage 2 Stage 4 
Explanatory variable 
Estimate t-value Estimate t-value 
Length of schooling 0.0418 61.33 0.0400 46.10 
Experience 0.0167 23.49 0.0156 19.90 
Experience squared -0.0003 -17.65 -0.0002 -15.15 
Dummy for 1988 3.9007 275.28 3.9495 200.05 
Dummy for 1989 3.8974 282.78 3.9478 199.65 
Dummy for 1999 3.9260 284.77 3.9744 205.10 
Dummy for 1991 3.9688 287.05 4.0156 210.27 
Dummy for 1992 3.9641 286.07 4.0107 210.09 
Dummy for 1993 3.9732 289.23 4.0199 211.36 
Dummy for 1994 3.9883 290.84 4.0337 215.09 
Dummy for 1995 3.9925 288.91 4.0386 213.16 
Dummy for 1996 4.0019 285.65 4.0470 214.04 
Dummy for 1997 4.0196 280.53 4.0641 213.66 
Dummy for 1998 4.0456 276.38 4.0884 215.85 
Dummy for 1999 4.0678 277.09 4.1102 217.43 
Dummy for 2000 4.0705 277.43 4.1128 217.73 
Dummy for 2001 4.0710 275.42 4.1136 215.98 
Dummy for 2002 4.1340 293.12 4.1757 227.72 
Selection, −logP   -0.0642 3.5537 
No. of observations 37,914 37,914 
Std. error of regression  0.299 
R2  0.150 
 
Using McFadden’s 2ρ  as a measure of goodness of fit (cf. McFadden, 1984), estimated to 0.68, we 
conclude that the model fits the data rather well. In the last column of Table 3, we report, for 
comparative reasons, the results of a constrained model in which it is assumed a priori that the 
discouraged worker effect does not enter the model. Apart from a significant loss of explanatory 
power, the most striking feature is the higher coefficient associated with age and the logarithm of the 
wage rate. From Table 4, we note that we are able to explain the trend in the labor force participation 
rates without introducing a trend in the specification of the utility of not working. 
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Table 3. Maximum likelihood estimates from stages 3 and 5a  
Stage 3 Stage 5 Para-
meter Parameter attached to With DWb-effect With DW-effect Without DW-effect 
θ Predicted log real wage 4.9384 (29.07) 
5.1422 
 (29.05) 
5.7696 
(39.35) 
γ1 Intercept 
-22.9973 
(-26.62) 
-24.1019 
(-26.82) 
-27.9472 
(-42.51) 
γ2 Age 
0.2360 
(15.89) 
0.2405 
(16.10) 
0.2727 
(19.55) 
γ3 Age squared 
-0.0034 
(-19.23) 
-0.0034 
(-19.53) 
-0.0037 
(-22.33) 
γ4 log(non-labor real income) 
-0.0917 
(-5.57) 
-0.0916 
 (-5.56) 
-0.0895 
(-5.45) 
γ5 Number of children 
-0.5037 
(-31.46) 
-0.5033 
(-31.44) 
-0.5295 
(-34.04) 
c Discouraged worker effect  4.9411   (5.88) 
4.9640 
   (5.91) 0
c 
Number of observations 46,969 46,969 46,969 
Log-likelihood value -21,505 -21,544 -21,523 
McFaddens ρ2  0.68  
a  t-values are provided in parentheses.  b  DW stands for 'Discouraged worker'.  c  A priori restriction. 
 
17 
Table 4. Empirical participation rates and mean predicted participation rates 
a This column corresponds to the case where the estimates are initially taken from the maintained 
model, but where the estimates of the dummy variables in the wage equation for 1989–2002 are all 
replaced by the estimated value of the dummy variable for 1988. 
 
5.2. Discouraged worker effects and quasi-elasticities 
In Table 4 we compare, on an annual basis, the mean of the predicted labor market participation 
probabilities and the corresponding empirical labor market participation shares (cf. the second and the 
third column, respectively). Our parsimonious model does rather well in picking up the positive trend 
in female labor market participation over the years covered by the sample. The mean of the absolute 
value of the deviations taken over the fifteen years from 1988-2002 is about 0.007. The largest 
deviations, 0.025 and 0.021, are found for 1989 and 2002, respectively. To assess the magnitude of the 
discouraged worker effect we have in the fourth column of Table 4 calculated the mean of the 
predicted labor market participation probabilities in a hypothetical situation when the perceived 
conditional probability of obtaining employment, given search efforts, is assumed to equal one for all 
women in the sample (presented in the fourth column of Table 4). This "reference" case corresponds to 
an ideal situation in which the agent perceives with perfect certainty that she will get a job if she 
Mean of predicted participation rates 
Period 
Observed 
participation rate 
Observed 
unemployment 
rate Maintained model 
q = 1 No wage 
trenda 
1988 0.8056 0.0177 0.8012 0.8207 0.8012 
1989 0.8176 0.0265 0.7923 0.8223 0.7936 
1990 0.8283 0.0233 0.8187 0.8427 0.8006 
1991 0.8370 0.0278 0.8453 0.8707 0.7999 
1992 0.8484 0.0238 0.8479 0.8687 0.8064 
1993 0.8448 0.0278 0.8496 0.8743 0.8018 
1994 0.8636 0.0236 0.8641 0.8832 0.8099 
1995 0.8662 0.0285 0.8657 0.8889 0.8087 
1996 0.8777 0.0235 0.8766 0.8940 0.8168 
1997 0.8952 0.0218 0.8836 0.8988 0.8144 
1998 0.9061 0.0136 0.9041 0.9121 0.8280 
1999 0.8991 0.0128 0.9125 0.9193 0.8271 
2000 0.9112 0.0146 0.9144 0.9221 0.8292 
2001 0.9155 0.0159 0.9177 0.9256 0.8334 
2002 0.9141 0.0176 0.9351 0.9423 0.8272 
1988-2002 0.8647  0.8647 0.8830 0.8114 
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decides to search. Although this case will never occur in practice, it is useful in this context to 
illustrate the upper bound on labor supply. As seen from the last row of the table, the global predicted 
mean increases by about 0.018, which implies that about 13.5 percent of those outside the labor force 
are discouraged. Note that there is a substantial drop in the discouraged worker effect from 1997 on, 
which corresponds to a similar decrease in the unemployment rate from 1997. A much larger effect 
would occur if unemployment were higher and labor force participation lower. If, for example, the 
unemployment rate were 8 percent and labor force participation 80 percent, then the participation rate 
would increase to about 86 percent if unemployment vanished, which consequently implies that 30 
percent of workers are discouraged. If however the unemployment rate were 8 percent and the 
participation rate 70 percent, the corresponding increase in the participation rate would be about 8 
percentage points and the fraction discouraged would be 26.6 percent. By comparing these results with 
those obtained in Blundell, Ham, and Meghir (1998) we find the following: In their sample, about 64 
percent of the women are in the labor force and the average unemployment rate is 6.7 percent. Given 
the estimate of c in our model, this would correspond (using our model) to an increase of the labor 
force from 64 percent to about 72 percent, which means that the fraction of discouraged workers 
would be about 22.2 percent. The corresponding fraction of discouraged workers found by Blundell, 
Ham, and Meghir (1998) is about 10 percent (compared with the effect in our case of 13.5 percent). 
However, one must be cautious when interpreting these results because the specification and 
identification criteria used in Blundell, Ham, and Meghir (1988) differ from ours. In the last column of 
Table 4, we have simulated labor supply behavior in the counterfactual case with wage rates generated 
by the wage equation of 1988. As a consequence, the increase in labor force participation from 1988 to 
2002 reduces to about 2.7 percent (compared with the actual increase of about 13.5 percent). Most of 
this modest increase in labor force participation is due to increasing education levels and reduced 
unemployment in the sample. 
 Next, consider elasticities. Elasticities are characterized by being invariant to the arbitrary 
choice of units of measurement in both variables. In this section, we calculate a different type of 
elasticities. We have chosen to use socalled quasi-elasticities, (see Cramer, 2001, p. 8). The motivation 
for this is that “probability” is already a relative concept and its scale is not arbitrary. The individual 
quasi-wage and quasi-non-labor-income elasticities are given by:  
(6.1) ( )1
log
it
it it
it
P P P
EW
θ∂ = −
∂
, 
and:  
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(6.2) ( )4
4
1it it it
i t
P P P
Z
γ∂ = −
∂
, 
where 4i tZ  is the logarithm of non-labor income. These elasticities yield the change in the probability 
of participation in the labor force resulting from an increase in the wage rate and non-labor income, 
respectively. The quasi-elasticity with respect to the unemployment rate8, 1 itq− , is given by:  
(6.3) ( ) ( ) 2
11
1
it
it it
it it
P c P P
q q
∂
= − −
∂ −
. 
In Table 5, we report for each year in the sample the annual mean of the quasi-wage, the quasi-non-
labor-income-and the quasi-unemployment elasticities. Let us for instance consider the mean 
elasticities in 1990 and 2000. In 1990 the mean quasi-elasticities for wage, non-labor income and 
unemployment are 0.70, –0.013 and –0.73, respectively, whereas the corresponding figures for 2000 
are 0.38, –0.0053 and –0.31. From Table 4, we note that the mean predicted labor force participation 
rates are 0.82 in 1990 and 0.91 in 2000. If we counterfactually assume a 5 percent universally higher 
real wage rate in 1990, the mean predicted participation rate would have increased to 0.855. 
Correspondingly, a 10 percent universal increase in non-labor income would have lowered the mean 
predicted participation rate by 0.001. Finally, if all the predicted perceived unemployment rates had 
been increased by 0.05, the mean predicted labor participation probability would have decreased to 
0.7835. If we make the same type of calculations for 2000, the changes in the mean predicted 
participation probabilities in the three counterfactual situations would have been about 0.02, –0.0005 
and –0.016, respectively. Because of a positive trend in female labor participation over the timespan, 
there is a negative trend in the mean quasi-wage elasticity over time. The mean quasi-non-labor-
income elasticity is rather small in magnitude. The quasi-unemployment elasticity, which picks up the 
discouraged worker effect, shows business cycle variations over time. Ceteris paribus, the quasi-
unemployment elasticity will be higher the higher is the perceived probability of being unemployed 
given search efforts.  
 
                                                     
8 As both P and 1−q are probabilities and hence dimensionless, we find it consistent with Cramer's intuition to label the 
derivative in (6.3) as a quasi-elasticity. 
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Table 5. Mean quasi-elasticities  
Year Quasi-wage elasticity Quasi-non-labor-income elasticity 
Quasi-unemployment 
elasticity 
1988 0.7637 -0.0136 -0.7785 
1989 0.7781 -0.0139 -0.8161 
1990 0.7044 -0.0125 -0.7319 
1991 0.6227 -0.0111 -0.6574 
1992 0.6175 -0.0110 -0.6416 
1993 0.6101 -0.0109 -0.6439 
1994 0.5624 -0.0100 -0.5850 
1995 0.5554 -0.0099 -0.5883 
1996 0.5217 -0.0093 -0.5422 
1997 0.4972 -0.0089 -0.5133 
1998 0.4240 -0.0076 -0.4265 
1999 0.3920 -0.0070 -0.3928 
2000 0.3825 -0.0068 -0.3857 
2001 0.3736 -0.0067 -0.3780 
2002 0.3003 -0.0053 -0.3057 
 
6.2. Quasi-elasticities for different population groups  
One advantage of using micro-data in structural analysis is that it allows the researcher to assess the 
importance of population heterogeneity when marginal effects from changes in exogenous variables 
are considered. In Table 6, we report quasi-elasticities related to the (real) wage, real non-labor income 
and unemployment for different groups of women. The groups differ with respect to combinations of 
age, length of schooling, number of children, and non-labor income. The non-labor income levels are 
given in constant 1998 prices. Among women aged 35 years, we distinguish between groups with 
zero, one, and three children, whereas, for women aged 55 years, we consider groups with zero and 
and one child. In the sixth column of Table 6, we report the predicted probability q of getting 
employment, given labor force participation, within the specific population group considered. In the 
seventh column of Table 6, we report the predicted probability of labor market participation for the 
respective population groups. As seen from formulae (6.1) to (6.3), the levels of the probabilities have 
major impacts on the quasi-elasticities.  Specifically, an increase in the probability of labor market 
participation implies a decrease in the absolute value of the quasi-elasticities.  
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Table 6.  Probability of employment, probability of labor supply, quasi-wage elasticity, quasi- 
non-labor-income elasticity and quasi-unemployment elasticity for different 
population groupsa 
Popu-
lation 
group 
Length 
of 
schooling 
Age No. of children 
Non-
labor 
incomeb 
Proba-
bility of 
getting a 
job, given 
search 
Proba-
bility of 
labor 
force 
partici-
pation 
Quasi-
wage 
elasticity 
Quasi-
non-
labor 
income 
elasticity 
Quasi-un-
employ-
ment 
elasticity 
1 14 35 0 1 0.9898 0.9933 0.0343 -0.0006 -0.0338 
2 14 35 1 1 0.9885 0.9889 0.0565 -0.0010 -0.0559 
3 14 35 3 1 0.9852 0.9697 0.1513 -0.0027 -0.1504 
4 14 35 0 167,000 0.9898 0.9801 0.1003 -0.0018 -0.0988 
5 14 35 1 167,000 0.9885 0.9673 0.1627 -0.0029 -0.1608 
6 14 35 3 167,000 0.9852 0.9140 0.4042 -0.0072 -0.4020 
7 14 35 0 300,000 0.9898 0.9790 0.1056 -0.0019 -0.1041 
8 14 35 1 300,000 0.9885 0.9655 0.1711 -0.0030 -0.1690 
9 14 35 3 300,000 0.9852 0.9097 0.4225 -0.0075 -0.4202 
10 14 35 0 600,000 0.9898 0.9777 0.1122 -0.0020 -0.1106 
11 14 35 1 600,000 0.9885 0.9634 0.1815 -0.0032 -0.1793 
12 14 35 3 600,000 0.9852 0.9043 0.4449 -0.0079 -0.4425 
13 18 35 0 1 0.9954 0.9965 0.0180 -0.0003 -0.0175 
14 18 35 1 1 0.9948 0.9942 0.0297 -0.0005 -0.0290 
15 18 35 3 1 0.9933 0.9841 0.0803 -0.0014 -0.0786 
16 18 35 0 167,000 0.9954 0.9895 0.0534 -0.0010 -0.0520 
17 18 35 1 167,000 0.9948 0.9827 0.0874 -0.0016 -0.0852 
18 18 35 3 167,000 0.9933 0.9537 0.2269 -0.0040 -0.2220 
19 18 35 0 300,000 0.9954 0.9889 0.0563 -0.0010 -0.0548 
20 18 35 1 300,000 0.9948 0.9818 0.0920 -0.0016 -0.0898 
21 18 35 3 300,000 0.9933 0.9513 0.2382 -0.0042 -0.2331 
22 18 35 0 600,000 0.9954 0.9882 0.0599 -0.0011 -0.0583 
23 18 35 1 600,000 0.9948 0.9806 0.0978 -0.0017 -0.0954 
24 18 35 3 600,000 0.9933 0.9483 0.2522 -0.0045 -0.2468 
25 14 55 0 1 0.9961 0.9840 0.0811 -0.0014 -0.0789 
26 14 55 1 1 0.9956 0.9737 0.1317 -0.0023 -0.1283 
27 14 55 0 167,000 0.9961 0.9533 0.2290 -0.0041 -0.2228 
28 14 55 1 167,000 0.9956 0.9248 0.3575 -0.0064 -0.3481 
29 14 55 0 300,000 0.9961 0.9508 0.2404 -0.0043 -0.2339 
30 14 55 1 300,000 0.9956 0.9210 0.3741 -0.0067 -0.3643 
31 14 55 0 600,000 0.9961 0.9478 0.2545 -0.0045 -0.2476 
32 14 55 1 600,000 0.9956 0.9163 0.3945 -0.0070 -0.3842 
33 18 55 0 1 0.9986 0.9930 0.0359 -0.0006 -0.0348 
34 18 55 1 1 0.9985 0.9884 0.0589 -0.0010 -0.0571 
35 18 55 0 167,000 0.9986 0.9791 0.1050 -0.0019 -0.1017 
36 18 55 1 167,000 0.9985 0.9659 0.1692 -0.0030 -0.1639 
37 18 55 0 300,000 0.9986 0.9780 0.1106 -0.0020 -0.1070 
38 18 55 1 300,000 0.9985 0.9641 0.1779 -0.0032 -0.1723 
39 18 55 0 600,000 0.9986 0.9766 0.1175 -0.0021 -0.1137 
40 18 55 1 600,000 0.9985 0.9619 0.1887 -0.0034 -0.1827 
a Calculations refer to 2000. The probability of being employed when offering work is taken as the arithmetic 
mean over the four quarters in 2000.   
b In constant 1998 prices. 
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 As an example, let us consider population group 8, consisting of women aged 35 in 2000, 
with 14 years of education, non-labor income equal to 300,000 NOK, and one child. For this group the 
predicted probability of participating in the labor market is 0.9655. The quasi-wage elasticity is 0.17, 
which means that a one percent increase in the real wage increases the probability of labor market 
participation to 0.9672. Correspondingly, a 10 percent increase in non-labor income yields a decrease 
in the probability equal to 0.0003. Hence, the response in labor supply to an increase in non-labor 
income is rather modest. The quasi-unemployment elasticity is about –0.17. That is, an increase in the 
unemployment rate from 0.012 to 0.062 leads to a decrease in the probability of labor market 
participation from 0.966 to 0.957.    
 If we compare group 8 with some of the other groups, we can illustrate the significance of 
partial changes in demographic variables. Group 9 differs from group 8 in that the women have three 
children instead of one. The predicted probability of labor market participation drops to 0.9097. As a 
consequence of this, the three quasi-elasticities are larger in absolute value for group 9 than for group 
8. Note that this effect works through two channels. More children decrease the probability of getting 
a job, conditional on search effort, but also increase the reservation wage.  
 Next let us compare population group 8 with group 21. The difference between these two 
groups is that the women in the latter have four more years of schooling. Higher education yields a 
higher expected real wage, which increases the probability of labor market participation from 0.9655 
to 0.9818. Accordingly, the absolute values of the quasi-elasticities are smaller for this highly 
educated group.  
 Finally, let us look at the effect of age. The difference between group 8 and group 30 is 
that the women in the latter one are twenty years older, 55 years against 35 for those in group 8. The 
effect of age operates in two opposing ways in this case. Higher age goes along with more experience, 
which leads to a higher expected real wage, which accordingly stimulates labor market participation. 
However, this effect is clearly dominated by the effect that increasing age increases the utility of not 
working (see Table 3). The total effect is that the predicted probability of labor market participation 
decreases from 0.9655 to 0.9210.   
7. Conclusions 
In this paper we have proposed a simple search-theoretic framework for rationalizing the discouraged 
worker effect, namely that labor force participation depends negatively on unemployment. Based on 
this framework, we have specified a static empirical model for the probability that a person is out of 
the labor force, unemployed, or employed in a given period. Subsequently, we have estimated the 
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model by means of a sample of independent cross sections for married women in Norway, covering 
the years from 1988 to 2002. 
 The estimation results show that the model explains the data very well without 
introducing time dummies for the utility of not working. For example, the mean quasi-wage elasticity 
in for example 2000 is somewhat lower than 0.40. The income effect is found to be very small. The 
effect of discouraged worker behavior can be summarized in two ways. First, if, for example the 
perceived unemployment rates in 2000 increases by 0.01, the mean probability of married women 
being in the labor force decreases by about 0.004 percentage points. Second, relative to a situation 
with no unemployment, the average fraction of women outside the labor force who are discouraged is 
about 13.5 percent. 
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Appendix A 
Summary statistics 
 
Table A1. Share of total number of persons in different labor market states 
Year Outside the labor force Unemployed Employed 
1988 0.1944 0.0177 0.7879 
1989 0.1824 0.0265 0.7911 
1990 0.1717 0.0233 0.8050 
1991 0.1630 0.0278 0.8092 
1992 0.1516 0.0238 0.8246 
1993 0.1552 0.0278 0.8170 
1994 0.1364 0.0236 0.8400 
1995 0.1338 0.0285 0.8377 
1996 0.1223 0.0235 0.8542 
1997 0.1048 0.0218 0.8734 
1998 0.0939 0.0136 0.8924 
1999 0.1009 0.0128 0.8863 
2000 0.0888 0.0146 0.8966 
2001 0.0845 0.0159 0.8997 
2002 0.0859 0.0176 0.8965 
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Table A2. Summary statistics of selected variables 
Year Statistic Real wage rate
Real non-
labor income Age Education 
No. of 
children
Mean 103.57 182,637 41.05 11.06 1.25
Std. dev. 32.76 78,829 9.40 2.25 1.10
Min  35.23 89.67 25 6 0
Max 265.20 503,700 60 20 6
1988 
No. of obs. 1,912 2,546 2,546 2,546 2,546
Mean 104.34 180,958 40.54 11.12 1.23
Std. dev. 36.64 78,755 9.40 2.32 1.09
Min  34.01 261.43 25 6 0
Max 319.60 528,782 60 20 5
1989 
No. of obs. 2,490 3,322 3,322 3,322 3,322
Mean 107.85 186,827 41.08 11.35 1.26
Std. dev. 36.08 80,852 9.28 2.45 1.12
Min  34.08 251.70 25 6 0
Max 369.33 556,812 60 20 8
1990 
No. of obs. 2,775 3,610 3,610 3,610 3,610
Mean 112.82 185,513 41.33 11.38 1.26
Std. dev. 37.45 82,609 9.04 2.44 1.13
Min  38.66 81.74 25 6 0
Max 342.78 566,791 60 20 7
1991 
No. of obs. 2,849 3,706 3,706 3,706 3,706
Mean 112.65 190,400 41.68 11.47 1.25
Std. dev. 38.18 90,463 9.13 2.47 1.14
Min  38.79 157.49 25 6 0
Max 339.00 591,414 60 20 10
1992 
No. of obs. 2,822 3,575 3,575 3,575 3,575
Mean 113.82 189,391 40.71 11.59 1.31
Std. dev. 39.38 90,535 9.22 2.43 1.12
Min  40.07 231.20 25 6 0
Max 401.01 604,604 60 20 10
1993 
No. of obs. 3,050 3,891 3,891 3,891 3,891
Mean 115.44 192,056 40.91 11.71 1.27
Std. dev. 36.98 89,305 9.33 2.49 1.13
Min  39.36 75.90 25 6 0
Max 306.84 636,107 60 20 9
1994 
No. of obs. 3,257 4,076 4,076 4,076 4,076
Mean 117.72 197,740 40.92 11.9 1.3
Std. dev. 42.22 93,309 9.17 2.58 1.12
Min  39.72 149.72 25 6 0
Max 455.85 644,538 60 20 8
1995 
No. of obs. 3,231 4,042 4,042 4,042 4,042
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Table A2 (cont.) 
Year Statistic Real wage rate
Real non-
labor income Age Education 
No. of 
children
Mean 118.54 202,795 41.21 12.03 1.28
Std. dev. 38.45 93,971 9.25 2.57 1.13
Min  35.23 89.67 25 6 0
Max 397.96 665,277 60 20 13
1996 
No. of obs 2,790 3,402 3,402 3,402 3,402
Mean 121.21 205,714 41.06 12 1.34
Std. dev. 43.76 98,978 9.30 2.57 1.15
Min  30.44 359.86 25 6 0
Max 480.00 706,931 60 20 10
1997 
No. of obs. 2,136 2,528 2,528 2,528 2,528
Mean 124.65 217,358 41.45 12.19 1.29
Std. dev. 41.25 106,777 9.47 2.58 1.17
Min  42.39 1,390 25 6 0
Max 386.5 789,376 60 20 8
1998 
No. of obs. 1,834 2,129 2,129 2,129 2,129
Mean 127.58 218,130 41.79 12.23 1.30
Std. dev. 41.77 107,471 9.50 2.65 1.17
Min  40.19 410.60 25 6 0
Max 361.86 826,739 60 20 10
1999 
No. of obs. 1,812 2,111 2,111 2,111 2,111
Mean 129.03 224,037 41.62 12.25 1.29
Std. dev. 46.99 110,072 9.27 2.63 1.17
Min  36.97 728.99 25 6 0
Max 499.5 861,205 60 20 10
2000 
No. of obs. 1,842 2,128 2,128 2,128 2,128
Mean 129.7 232,037 42.25 12.44 1.26
Std. dev. 44.08 114,674 9.30 2.62 1.14
Min  36.96 772.56 25 6 0
Max 446.36 896,490 60 20 6
2001 
No. of obs. 1,862 2,143 2,143 2,143 2,143
Mean 138.08 237,799 42.32 12.45 1.3
Std. dev. 46.53 119,857 9.50 2.57 1.15
Min  53.64 191.09 25 6 0
Max 434.54 978,439 60 20 9
2002 
No. of obs. 3,252 3,760 3,760 3,760 3,760
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Appendix B 
Results from estimation stage 1 
Table B1. Estimates of the probability of getting a job, conditional on search efforts 
Explanatory variable Interpretation of explanatory variable Estimate t-value 
B1 Education 0.2856 16.04 
B2 Experience 0.1245 7.92 
B3 Experience squared -0.0016 -4.53 
B4 Number of children -0.1264 -3.54 
B5 Dummy for 1988Q2 -0.5936 -1.44 
B6 Dummy for 1988Q3 -1.1451 -3.05 
B7 Dummy for 1988Q4 -1.0093 -2.58 
B8 Dummy for 1989Q1 -1.4241 -4.05 
B9 Dummy for 1989Q2 -1.2053 -3.30 
B10 Dummy for 1989Q3 -1.3030 -3.57 
B11 Dummy for 1989Q4 -1.3419 -3.68 
B12 Dummy for 1990Q1 -1.5171 -4.29 
B13 Dummy for 1990Q2 -1.3437 -3.76 
B14 Dummy for 1990Q3 -0.9810 -2.57 
B15 Dummy for 1990Q4 -1.0511 -2.74 
B16 Dummy for 1991Q1 -1.4109 -4.00 
B17 Dummy for 1991Q2 -1.1207 -2.98 
B18 Dummy for 1991Q3 -1.7066 -4.93 
B19 Dummy for 1991Q4 -1.4767 -4.14 
B20 Dummy for 1992Q1 -1.6498 -4.67 
B21 Dummy for 1992Q2 -1.2383 -3.32 
B22 Dummy for 1992Q3 -1.1062 -2.95 
B23 Dummy for 1992Q4 -1.1301 -2.98 
B24 Dummy for 1993Q1 -1.5438 -4.39 
B25 Dummy for 1993Q2 -1.4032 -3.97 
B26 Dummy for 1993Q3 -1.5273 -4.37 
B27 Dummy for 1993Q4 -1.2223 -3.39 
B28 Dummy for 1994Q1 -0.9488 -2.51 
B29 Dummy for 1994Q2 -1.5177 -4.36 
B30 Dummy for 1994Q3 -1.4672 -4.19 
B31 Dummy for 1994Q4 -0.9807 -2.59 
B32 Dummy for 1995Q1 -1.5798 -4.53 
B33 Dummy for 1995Q2 -1.6665 -4.80 
B34 Dummy for 1995Q3 -1.6799 -4.85 
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Table B1 (cont.) 
Explanatory variable Interpretation of explanatory variable Estimate t-value 
B35 Dummy for 1995Q4 -0.9786 -2.57 
B36 Dummy for 1996Q1 -1.4986 -4.17 
B37 Dummy for 1996Q2 -1.6920 -4.73 
B38 Dummy for 1996Q3 -1.1437 -2.91 
B39 Dummy for 1996Q4 -0.7266 -1.71 
B40 Dummy for 1997Q1 -1.2334 -3.20 
B41 Dummy for 1997Q2 -1.2531 -3.17 
B42 Dummy for 1997Q3 -1.5541 -3.99 
B43 Dummy for 1997Q4 -0.4425 -0.87 
B44 Dummy for 1998Q1 -0.8836 -1.96 
B45 Dummy for 1998Q2 -1.0746 -2.37 
B46 Dummy for 1998Q3 -0.9581 -2.12 
B47 Dummy for 1998Q4 0.4828 0.63 
B48 Dummy for 1999Q1 -1.0131 -2.24 
B49 Dummy for 1999Q2 -0.6364 -1.25 
B50 Dummy for 1999Q3 -0.2314 -0.40 
B51 Dummy for 1999Q4 -0.8321 -1.78 
B52 Dummy for 2000Q1 -0.6729 -1.39 
B53 Dummy for 2000Q2 -0.4059 -0.75 
B54 Dummy for 2000Q3 -1.1729 -2.66 
B55 Dummy for 2000Q4 -0.9879 -2.19 
B56 Dummy for 2001Q1 0.0247 0.04 
B57 Dummy for 2001Q2 -0.7728 -1.51 
B58 Dummy for 2001Q3 -1.0713 -2.36 
B59 Dummy for 2001Q4 -1.5135 -3.81 
B60 Dummy for 2002Q1 -0.3846 -0.75 
B61 Dummy for 2002Q2 -0.9406 -2.19 
B62 Dummy for 2002Q3 -1.3120 -3.50 
B63 Dummy for 2002Q4 -1.2701 -3.53 
Number of observations 40,614 
Log-likelihood value -4,584 
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Appendix C 
 
Proof of Lemma 1: 
Under the distributional assumption in (3.8), it follows that:   
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which proves (3.8). To prove (3.9), note that it follows from (C.1) that: 
(C.3) 
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Furthermore, we have: 
 ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ }( )0 2 0 2 0 2max , , exp exp exp−≤ = ≤ ≤ = − +xP U U x P U x U x e v v µµ µ , 
which yields: 
(C.4)
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By combining (C.2), (C.3), and (C.4) we obtain that: 
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(C.5) 
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Consequently, we obtain: 
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which completes the proof. 
  Q.E.D. 
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